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The traditional Hippocratic belief that one could do almost 
anything on a patient as long as the principles of beneficence 
(best interests) and non-maleficence (no harm) were upheld 
has been considerably revolutionised over the last century. 
Paternalism, the belief that the health care practitioner should 
protect or advance the interests of the patient even if contrary 
to the patient’s own immediate desires or freedom of choice, 
no longer has a place in the health care context.  Pursuant 
to the Nuremburg Trials, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and several other codes and guidelines emanating from 
international bodies such as the World Medical Association un-
derscore, among other ethical tenets, the value of autonomy 
and self-determination. Autonomous actions are the outcome 
of deliberations and choices by rational agents as persons in 
the moral sense. Rational persons meet the criteria necessary 
to decide what is in their own best interests. Health care practi-
tioners have a duty to recognise and respect this value in their 
patients. Not to do so would not only violate their patients’ au-
tonomy, but would be synonymous with treating them as less 
than persons.1 An autonomous person is someone who has 
the ability to deliberate about personal goals and to act under 
the direction of such deliberation. Respecting autonomy de-
notes valuing the autonomous person’s considered opinions 
and choices and refraining from obstructing their actions un-
less they are clearly detrimental to others.2  
While there has been widespread acceptance of patient 
autonomy, with patients being the ultimate decision-makers in 
matters that affect themselves, the clinical autonomy and free-
dom in determining patient management that medical practi-
tioners traditionally enjoyed has been significantly curbed by, 
inter alia, governments, medical insurers and the economic 
climate. Hence, autonomy or self-determination, one of the 
foundational principles in medical practice, has changed to a 
large extent over the years.3
In this paper, I will attempt to provide a global overview of 
informed consent from the perspective of both ethics and the 
law. Pertinent sections of the law will be discussed in order to 
provide an update on the current legal status of informed con-
sent in present-day South Africa.
The meaning of informed consent
Founded on basic ethico-legal principles, the doctrine of in-
formed consent entails a process of information sharing and 
decision making based on mutual respect and participation. It 
should be considered a procedure and not merely an affirma-
tion, ritual or signature on a piece of paper at a particular point 
in time. The idea behind informed consent is that it facilitates 
the performance of professional tasks in a morally defensible 
way by bringing the patient’s informed preferences into the 
health care practitioner’s plans. Being well informed on enter-
ing the decision-making process protects the patient’s dignity 
in the health care environment. The fundamental belief behind 
informed consent is that trust between the health care prac-
titioner and the patient will be fostered and engendered.4 An 
obvious requirement for ensuring that consent is truly informed 
is a health care practitioner with communication, listening and 
interpretative skills. In addition, it is an ethical imperative that 
the health care practitioner recognises and respects the pa-
tient’s choice of decision, which may be that of informed re-
fusal rather than consent.  
In law, the health care practitioner-patient relationship is 
usually a contractual one with the contract taking the form of an 
implied agreement that the health care practitioner will make 
a diagnosis and treat the patient in accordance with generally 
accepted standards.4 All forms of management must be dis-
cussed with the patient first. A related legal concept is the idea 
of a fiduciary relationship, whereby the patient places a special 
trust or confidence in the health care practitioner. Hence the 
health care practitioner violates his or her legal duty if informa-
tion that is necessary for a patient to make a rational decision 
regarding care is withheld.4 
Consent to treatment can be expressed either orally or in 
writing (signed), or can be implied (tacit) by conduct. In law, 
there is no difference between written or oral consent, except 
that written consent is easier to prove should a dispute ensue.5 
Usually when a patient undergoes surgery or complex proce-
dures, written consent is required. It is the duty of the health 
care practitioner to ensure that consent has been obtained 
from the patient. The health care practitioner cannot rely on a 
nurse or other health care professional to ensure that consent 
has been obtained. Treatment without proper consent could 
result in the health care practitioner being guilty of the crime 
of assault or invasion of privacy if, for example, blood is tested 
without consent.5    
Validity of consent
The ethical and legal elements of a valid consent process 
are:5
•   Disclosure
•   Understanding
•   Capacity
•   Voluntariness.
Disclosure
The patient should not only be given information on the pro-
posed management but be informed of the risks and compli-
cations associated with the treatment. In addition, the patient 
should be given information on possible alternatives to the pro-
posed management, the range of diagnostic procedures and 
treatment options generally available and information on how 
she or he would fare should no treatment be implemented. The 
consent, once obtained, would be comprehensive, i.e. would 
include consent to risks and complications.5 Section 6 of the 
National Health Act6 further states that patients should be in-
formed of their rights to refuse the health service, i.e. diagnostic 
and/or therapeutic procedures. They should also be informed 
of the implications, risks and obligations of such refusal. 
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The exact information to be disclosed to the patient has 
been the subject of much debate. In the past, the accepted 
standard of disclosure was that of the ‘professional community 
standard’. How much information to be imparted was largely a 
matter of health care practitioner discretion. This professional 
community standard has in most jurisdictions been replaced 
by the ‘reasonable patient’ standard, which entails a patient-
centred approach to informed consent.7 The health care prac-
titioner does not have to painstakingly point out all the con-
ceivable complications that may arise.8 She/he is obliged to 
warn the patient of any ‘material’ risks inherent in the proposed 
treatment.5 A risk would be material if a reasonable person in 
the position of the patient when warned of the risk would at-
tach significance to it. Moreover, the health care practitioner 
should reasonably be aware that the patient, if warned of the 
risk, would attach significance to it.9 In determining the stand-
ard for disclosure, it would be important to take into considera-
tion the patient’s background and the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of each decision for the patient’s well-being. 
The health care practitioner providing the pertinent information 
must personalise the amount and the type of information pro-
vided despite the difficulty in doing so.4  Furthermore, the Na-
tional Health Act makes provision for the therapeutic privilege 
by allowing for the withholding of information in circumstances 
where there is substantial evidence that the disclosure would 
be contrary to the interests of the patient.6 
Understanding
A requisite for the health care practitioner is the obligation to 
ascertain the level of a patient’s ability to grasp the information 
given, i.e the mental competence or capacitation.4  One of the 
greatest challenges to the doctrine of informed consent is the 
difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the patient truly under-
stands and grasps the nature of his/her illness and the basis 
for consenting or refusing the management proposed. Of as-
sistance are the four levels of competence that have been pro-
posed by Appelbaum and Grisso.10 Ideally, the patient should 
have all four levels for optimal competence. 
1. The ability to communicate choices. 
2.  The ability to understand relevant information upon which 
the choice is made.
3.  The ability to appreciate the situation according to one’s own 
values.
4. The ability to weigh various values to arrive at a decision.
Information sharing should be in simple, understandable 
language, preferably in a language that the patient understands, 
and in a manner that takes into consideration the patient’s level 
of literacy.6 Differences of language and culture are two major 
obstacles to good practitioner-patient communication, with dif-
ferences in cultural understanding of the nature and cause of 
illness at times impeding the understanding of the diagnosis 
and treatment options provided by the practitioner.3        
Capacity
Capacity refers to mental and legal capacity to consent. The 
patient should be in the appropriate frame of mind to make an 
informed decision. When this is not possible, a legally appoint-
ed proxy may provide the consent. Section 7 of the National 
Health Act6 stipulates:
… a health service may not be provided to a user without 
the user’s informed consent, unless –
(a)  the user is unable to give consent and such consent is 
given by a person – 
 (i)  mandated by the user in writing to grant consent 
on his or her behalf; or
 (ii)  authorized to give such consent in terms of any 
law or court order;
(b)  the user is unable to give informed consent and no per-
son is mandated or authorized to give such consent, 
and the consent is given by the spouse or partner of 
the user, or, in the absence of such spouse or partner, 
a parent, grandparent, an adult child, or a brother or 
sister of the user in the specific order as listed;
(c)  the provision of a health service without informed con-
sent is authorized in terms of any law or a court order;
(d)  failure to treat the user, or group of people which in-
cludes the user, will result in a serious risk to public 
health; or
(e)  any delay in the provision of the health service to the 
user might result in his or her death or irreversible dam-
age to his or her health and the user has not expressly, 
impliedly or by conduct refused that service.       
According to the Mental Health Care Act,11 a health care 
provider or health establishment may provide care, treatment 
or rehabilitation services to, or admit, a patient if the patient 
consents, or where a court order or Review Board authorises 
such treatment or admission or where, owing to mental illness, 
any delay may result in death or irreversible harm to the pa-
tient, infliction of serious harm on the patient or others, or dam-
age or loss of property belonging to the patient or others.    
Legal capacity refers to age of consent. According to sec-
tion 28 of the Bill of Rights, a child is any person less than 18 
years of age.12 In addition, the Children’s Act13 places the age 
of majority at 18. At the time of writing, some sections of the 
Child Care Act14 are still in force while selected sections of the 
Children’s Act have already been promulgated. Section 39(4) 
of the Child Care Act (still in force) provides that children of 
14 years or over may consent to medical treatment and per-
sons of 18 years or over may consent to surgical operations. 
This will change when the pertinent sections of the Children’s 
Act are promulgated. Children aged 12 years and older would 
be able to consent to medical treatments provided they are of 
sufficient maturity to do so. Children aged 12 years and older 
would be able to consent to surgical treatment provided they 
are of sufficient maturity and duly assisted by the parent or 
guardian. The challenge here is how maturity is determined, 
in particular where the child is a first-time patient and there 
has not been sufficient time to establish a medical practitioner-
family relationship. Furthermore, the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act15 provides for termination on request up to 12 
weeks of pregnancy for females of any age with no stipulations 
with regard to ‘maturity’. 
For children less than 12, parental, guardian or caregiver 
consent will be requisite for medical management. Regarding 
surgical procedures for children under 12, the Act stipulates 
the need for parental or guardian consent, and is silent on the 
issue of caregiver consent. The law, while differentiating be-
tween medical and surgical treatments on the issue of age of 
consent, makes no mention of level of risk and invasiveness 
of treatment. It would make more sense if risk determined the 
age of consent rather than simply medical or surgical manage-
ment.  The Act also states that no parent, guardian or caregiver 
of a child may refuse to assist a child or withhold consent be-
cause of religious or other beliefs, unless they can show that 
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there is a medically accepted alternative choice to the medical 
treatment or surgical operation concerned. Hence, in this situ-
ation, it would have to be the parent, guardian or caregiver that 
applies for a Court Order to prevent treatment. So far, it has 
been the obligation of the practitioner to make an application 
to institute management in the best interests of the child when 
consent has been withheld. 
Section 130(2) of the Children’s Act (in force) provides that 
where it is in their best interests children may consent to an 
HIV test if they are aged 12 years or over, or if they are under 
12 years of age and are sufficiently mature to understand the 
benefits, risks and social implications of such a test. Where 
it is in their best interests and children under 12 years of age 
are not sufficiently mature to consent, consent may be given 
by a parent or caregiver, the provincial head of social develop-
ment, or a designated child protection organisation. Caregiver 
is widely defined in the Act, and could include anyone who 
cares for the child. Where it is in the child’s best interests and 
consent is unreasonably withheld, application may be made to 
a Children’s Court to authorise the HIV test. A court application 
may also be made if it is in the child’s best interests and the 
child, parent or caregiver is incapable of giving consent.
Also in force is Section 134(1) of the Children’s Act which 
states that no person may refuse to sell condoms to children 
over the age of 12 years or to provide condoms to children 
over the age of 12 years on request where condoms are pro-
vided or distributed free of charge. Section 134(2) of the Act 
provides that contraceptives other than condoms may be pro-
vided on request by a child without the consent of a parent or 
caregiver if the child is at least 12 years of age, proper medical 
advice is given to the child, and the child is medically examined 
for contraindications.
Both the Child Care Act and the Children’s Act are similar to 
section 28 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution12 in stipulating 
that in all activities involving a child, the child’s best interests 
are of paramount importance. Parental refusal to treat the child 
may be overridden where it is unreasonable and such lack of 
treatment could impact negatively on the child. The Acts makes 
provision to apply for a Court Order to reverse parental refusal. 
This would apply in the semi-elective and elective situations. In 
an emergency, the health care practitioner should proceed with 
immediate management. 
Voluntariness
For informed consent to be genuinely valid, there should be no 
coercion or manipulation compelling the patient to consent or 
refuse against her or his own best interests and wishes. Spe-
cial safeguards are recommended to protect those patients 
considered to be vulnerable and in dependant positions, e.g. 
the elderly, as there is a tendency for the voluntariness ele-
ment of informed consent to be eroded in these situations. 
The South African Constitution and  
consent12
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution on freedom 
and security of the person affirms in subsection 2 that every-
one has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which in-
cludes the right to security and control over their body. Accord-
ingly all patients in South Africa have the right to free choice 
and informed consent and refusal in the health care context. 
However, section 36 limits all rights in the Bill of Rights on con-
dition that the limitation can be demonstrated to be reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society. Hence, au-
tonomy is not absolute. Where patients request non-therapeu-
tic procedures or procedures not accommodated for in public 
policy, while their ability to make free choices is respected, it 
would be acceptable not to accede to their requests. In addi-
tion, recent involuntary admissions of patients with extremely 
drug-resistant tuberculosis in South Africa could be justified by 
invoking section 36. Moreover, every right has a correspond-
ing responsibility. An important aspect of the informed con-
sent process would be the need to highlight the importance 
of patients honouring their obligatory responsibilities as part 
of the health care practitioner-patient relationship. The rights 
and limitations to informed consent, informed refusal and the 
corresponding responsibilities are also detailed in the Patients’ 
Rights Charter.16
Research and consent
Respect for persons entails that participants enter research 
voluntarily and with adequate information that they have under-
stood. In terms of section 71 of the National Health Act,6 con-
sent in research must be written. Where minors are involved 
in therapeutic research, consents of the parent/guardian and 
minor (if in a position to understand) must be obtained before 
their participation. In the case of non-therapeutic research in-
volving minors, in addition to the respective consents, permis-
sion should also be obtained from the Minister of Health. There 
was clearly a lack of insight into the therapeutic/non-therapeu-
tic distinctions when this aspect of the law was formulated.
With regard to research involving retrospective record re-
views and data collection, there is no need for the patient’s 
consent where the data are anonymised in terms of section 
16 of the Act.
Conclusion
While the informed consent process is quite challenging in 
many respects, it is ethically, legally and at a human level 
imperative that patients are accorded their rights to self-de-
termination. Effective communication and trust are central to 
a healthy practitioner-patient relationship. A practitioner who 
respects a patient’s autonomy in turn gains the trust and re-
spect of the patient. Informed consent and respect for persons 
is now standard of care in health care practice and must be 
integrated into South African health care practice if the needs 
and desires of our patients are to be respected. Informed con-
sent is not merely a legalistic exercise, but must be seen as a 
process that empowers our patients to exercise their capacity 
to plan and execute their decisions regarding their health, tak-
ing into consideration their own values and beliefs.      
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